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INTERROGATORIES AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS
Although the work of administrative agencies has been
successfully carried on for several decades, there persists, in
some quarters, the belief that peculiar and sinister forces are
at work in the shaping of administrative decisions. This be-
lief is much stronger when the decision is handed down by a
national administrative tribunal. Perhaps it is based on the
still present fear of what Lord Hewart of Bury termed "The
New Despotism," that is, the encroachments of bureaucracy.'
The so-called mysteries of administrative judgments have
been attacked in the courts in an attempt to ascertain the
various mental processes preliminary to official admin-
istrative determinations. From time to time, administrative
decisions will undoubtedly again be similarly challenged and
opposed. It is important, therefore, to examine how the
opposition to the privileged nature of preliminary administra-
tive proceedings has fared in the courts and what results can
be expected in the future.
The point of departure for this examination is the English
case of Local Government Board v. Arlidge.2 This case
greatly influenced modern American cases which have in-
volved a probing of the processes underlying administrative
decisions. In the Ar~dge case, the Court of Appeal had
ordered the issuance of a writ of certiorari for the purpose of
quashing an order of the Local Government Board. This
order had dismissed the respondent's appeal from the refusal
of the local authority to determine a closing order under the
Housing, Town Planning, etc., Act, 1909.' In an appeal to
the House of Lords by the Local Government Board, the
order of the Court of Appeal was reversed.
1 HEWART, THE NEW DESPoTISnm (1929).
2 [1915] A.C. 120.
3 9 EDW. VII, C. 44, § 17.
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The grounds upon which the writ of certiorari was sought
were that the applicant had been refused an oral hearing,
and that he was not permitted to see the report of the In-
spector who held the necessary public local inquiry before
the appeal was dismissed, and that the order did not disclose
by which officer of the Board the appeal had been decided.
The Court of Appeal made absolute a rule for a writ of
certiorari. The House of Lords, in reversing this decision,
held that when an executive department is entrusted by
Parliament with judicial duties, Parliament must, in the
absence of an indication to the contrary, be taken to have
intended it to follow its own procedure, and though the
department must act in good faith and allow a sufficient
opportunity to present the case, it was not bound to employ
the methods of the courts. Thus an early precedent was
set for the autonomous operation of administrative tribunals
in the proper exercise of their duties. Critics of this case,
notably Lord Hewart, held a different view of the degree
of autonomy which should properly be enjoyed by these
tribunals. "The effect of the decision," Hewart stated,
"seems to be that where judicial functions are vested in a
Minister or Government department, parties to the pro-
ceedings have none of the securities against injustice which
they enjoy in judicial proceedings before the Courts." ' But
there was no indirection in reasoning. An administrative
agency had acted in good faith as it saw fit under its statu-
tory mandate and the House of Lords saw no necessity for
a disclosure of the mental processes underlying the admin-
istrative action.
In an American case decided some years later, C. J.
Tower & Sons v. United States,5 the court took up the
matter of disclosure of the underlying bases which lead up
to official administrative action. In that case Secretary of
the Treasury Mellon had been questioned by written inter-
4 HEWART, OP. dt. spra note 1, at 167.
5 71 F. (2d) 438 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
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rogatories as to his participation in a certain order required
to be made by the Secretary, but which was alleged to have
been made by one of his assistants. The Secretary said he
recalled the matter in question, though not in detail, since
seven years had elapsed from the time of the transaction.
Further, the Secretary pointed out, it was impossible for
him to remember all the facts of all the transactions of his
department during that period. The court stated in its
opinion that recollection of a myriad of departmental de-
tails, after seven or eight years, was not required of the
Secretary.
In 1938 and 1939 there was a flurry of cases which at-
tempted to find out the various undisclosed procedures
which had been preliminary to the actual rendering of par-
ticular administrative decisions. In National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Biles Coleman Lumber Company,6 the court
refused to make inquiry into the Board's procedure where
there was merely an allegation on information and belief
that the Board members had failed to read all of the testi-
mony in the case or examine the exhibits; it was charged
that the Board was not "competent to judicially appraise
and weigh the evidence or to form a basis for the findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and Order," and that the Board,
in its findings, had relied on subordinate employees. The
court held that there was no showing of a denial of due
process. Another important case, National Labor Relations
Board v. Cherry Cotton Mills,7 held, however, that the
court should receive evidence, in the form of depositions and
answers to interrogatories which had been addressed to -the
members of the Board, when such evidence questioned the
lawfulness of the Board's proceedings.
Again in Cupples Company Manufacturers v. National
Labor Relations Board,, there was an application for a
6 98 F. (2d) 16 (9th Cir. 1938).
7 98 F. (2d) 444 (5th Cir. 1938).
8 103 F. (2d) 953 (8th Cir. 1939).
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commission to take the depositions of the Board members
and for an order directing them to answer certain inter-
rogatories. The petition claimed that subordinate employees
had examined the record and then submitted findings and
suggestions to the Board. The court held that reliance by
the Board on administrative assistance was proper, and that
the allegation that the Board members, by relying on the
aid of subordinates, did not consider evidence in arriving
at the decision, was insufficient to justify the relief asked
by the petitioners. This case set a pattern for subsequent
decisions involving similar problems.' In another case,
National Labor Relations Board v. Botany Worsted Mills,
Inc.,1 ° the court also denied a petition for the issuance of
interrogatories to the members of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board. The judge in that case felt that "freedom of
deliberation" by an administrative body should not be re-
strained in such a manner.
In the Botany Worsted Mills case, the judge mentioned
at length authorities on the subject of the immunities of
judges, juries, courts martial and other bodies from having
their deliberations disclosed to public view. A well-anno-
tated portion of the opinion in Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Bab-
cock 11 is noteworthy in this connection: 1
When we turn to the evidence there is equal ground for
criticism. The members of the board were called, including
the Governor of the State, and submitted to an elaborate
cross-examination with regard to the operation of their minds
in valuing and taxing the roads. This was wholly improper.
In this respect the case does not differ from that of a jury
or an umpire, if we assume that the members of the board
were not entitled to the possibly higher immunities of a judge.
Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Bd. of Works, L.R. 5 H.L. 418,
9 See also: Ford Motor Co. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F. (2d) 905 (6th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 689, 61 S. Ct. 621, 85 L. Ed. 1126 (1941); Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F. (2d) 930 (lst Cir. 1940); Inland Steel Co.
v. N.L.R.B., 105 F. (2d) 246 (7th Cir. 1939).
10 106 F. (2d) 263 (3d Cir. 1939).
11 204 U.S. 585, 27 S. Ct. 326, 51 L. Ed. 636 (1907).
12 204 U.S. at 593.
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433. Jurymen cannot be called, even on a motion for a new
trial in the same case, to testify to the motives and influences
that led to their verdict. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.
140, 36 L. ed. 917, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50. So, as to arbitrators.
Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Bd. of Works, L.R. 5 H.L. 418,
457, 462. Similar reasoning was applied to a judge in Fayer-
weather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 306, 307, 49 L. ed. 193, 213,
214, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58. A multitude of cases will be found
collected in 4 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 2348, 2349. All the
often-repeated reasons for the rule as to jurymen apply with
redoubled force to the attempt, by exhibiting on cross-exami-
nation the confusion of the members' minds, to attack in
another proceeding the judgment of a lay tribunal, which is
intended, so far as may be, to be final, notwithstanding mis-
takes of fact or law. See Coulter v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
196 U.S. 599, 610, 49 L. ed. 615, 618, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342;
Central P. R. Co. v. California, 162 U.S. 91, 107, 108, 117,
40 L. ed. 903, 908, 909, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 766, 105 Cal. 576,
594, 38 Pac. 905; State Railroad Tax cases, 92 U.S. 575,
23 L. ed. 663; Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus,
133 Ind. 513, 542, 18 L.R.A. 729, 33 N.E. 421. In Fargo
v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490, 496, 497, 48 L. ed. 761, 764, 24 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 498, there was no serious dispute as to what was the
principle adopted.
The holding of a New York case states very plainly that
an arbitrator, who is a quasi-judicial officer, cannot be com-
pelled to testify as to the reasons for his decision." The
justification for this ruling is aptly discussed in a brief note
in a law journal, where it is stated: 4
... and the rule is established that no court may, upon motion
to vacate, review the administrators' findings of law or facts.
These involve matters of judgment only and to permit a court
to interfere with them would substitute the court's judgment
for that of the arbitrators. It is obvious that if arbitrators
could be compelled to testify as to the reasons for their deci-
sion and as to the method by which they arrived at an award,
a path would be paved for the court to consider the merits
of the award contrary to the established rule. In order to
avoid this result the courts have held that in such a proceed-
ing an arbitrator can neither volunteer nor be constrained to
produce evidence that would impeach his award. ...
1 Shirley Silk Co. v. American Silk Mills, Inc., 257 App. Div. 375, 13 N.Y.S.
(2d) 309 (1939).
14 17 N.Y.U.L.Q.R~v. 659 (1940).
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This reasoning is quite applicable to cases where the courts
refuse to permit the probing of administrators' minds for
the underlying reasons for their decisions. In one such case,
United States v. Standard Oil Company of California et a., 15
the court stated, in discussing the subject of interrogatories
for discovery of the undisclosed processes leading up to ad-
ministrative determinations: 6
Nor will the courts inquire into the "extent of his [re-
ferring to the Secretary of the Interior] investigation and
knowledge of the points decided, or as to the methods by
which he reached his determination." De Cambra v. Rogers
(1903) 189 U.S. 119, 122, 23 Sup. Ct. 519, 521, 47 L. Ed.
734. The defendants allege, upon information and belief,
that the decision of the Secretary was not made or based
upon the Secretary's own knowledge or consideration of the
record. In view of the presumption of regularity which at-
taches to the acts of administrative tribunals, especially those
of quasi-judicial power, these allegations do not plead any
issuable facts.
The judicial attitude expressed by the federal court in
this case was a stronger pronouncement of what was said
by the Supreme Court as far back as 1882, when it decided
the case of Steel v. St. Louis Smelting Company.7 Years
later, in a case involving railroad rates, the Supreme Court
indicated that there was no change in its attitude:'"
The report shows that the commission [referring to the
Interstate Commerce Commission] received much evidence
bearing upon the standards set by § 15(6) to govern it in mak-
ing the divisions. Appellants' claim that the order rests ex-
clusively upon the southern lines' financial needs is negatived
by the record. Many other facts were shown to have been
presented and considered. There is no requirement that the
commission specify the weight given to any item of evidence
or fact or disclose mental operations by which its decisions
are reached. Useful precision in respect of either would be
impossible. And it would be futile upon the record to attempt
15 20 F. Supp. 427 (S.D. Calif. 1937).
16 Id. at 448.
17 106 U.S. 447, 1 S. Ct. 389, 27 L. Ed. 226 (1882),
18 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 359, 56 S. Ct. 797,
80 L. Ed. 1209 (1936).
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definitely to ascertain the weight assigned to any fact or
argument in prescribing the divisions. We find no support
for appellants' claim. (Emphasis supplied.)
The case of Great Northern Railway Company v. Weeks19
presents another example of judicial adherence to the prin-
ciple that administrators and administrative bodies should
be protected in the proper exercise of their duties. In this
case it was held that in determining whether a tax assess-
ment was arbitrarily made and grossly excessive, the asses-
sors could not be compelled to submit to examination as to
the operation of their minds in making it. The court noted,
in part:"0
No testimony was given by the tax commissioner or any
other member of the board. They could not be compelled to
submit to examination as to the operation of their minds
in making the challenged assessment.
On the principle that such information was confidential,
and properly withheld, a producer who protested a decrease
in tariff rates on imported articles was refused the oppor-
tunity to take the testimony of Tariff Commission members
for the purpose of showing whether any other information
was conveyed by the Commission to the President, except
that stated in the report and findings.21 In yet another case,
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Company v. United States,22
a refusal by the Tariff Commission to disclose certain costs
was considered a proper exercise of its discretionary powers
in view of the confidential nature of the information.
Another federal court case is worthy of mention at this
point. In Brinkley v. Hassig,2" the administrative right to
render decisions without. fear that they will be impeached
in a subsequent proceeding was upheld. The circuit court
stated very plainly that:24
19 297 U.S. 135, 56 S. Ct. 426, 80 L. Ed. 532 (1936).
20 297 U.S. at 145.
21 Union Fork & Hoe Co. v. United States, S6 F. (2d) 423 (C.C.P.A. 1936'
22 288 U.S. 294, 53 S. Ct. 350, 77 L. Ed. 796 (1933).
28 83 F. (2d) 351 (10th Cir. 1936).
24 Id. at 358,
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Findings of administrative tribunals, like verdicts of juries,
cannot be overturned by a dissection of the mental processes
by which the result is reached, as long as it is reached from a
consideration of substantial evidence produced at the hearing.
The trial court would have been well within its power if this
minute exploration of the mental reactions of the members
of the board to particular items of evidence had been dras-
tically curtailed.
The case which finally, as Professor Gellhorn notes, "put
at rest the question of whether the mental processes of an
administrative tribunal are to be probed in later court pro-
ceedings" 21 was United States v. Morgan,26 called Morgan
IV. Here the Supreme Court sustained on all counts an
order of the Secretary of Agriculture. With respect to the
alleged impropriety of the Secretary's conduct of the pro-
ceedings which had resulted in the issuance of the order, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, said: 7
. . . the short of the business is that the Secretary should
never have been subjected to this examination [referring to
the examination by the lower court]. The proceeding before
the Secretary "has a quality resembling that of a judicial
proceeding" . . .Such an examination of a judge would be
destructive of judicial responsibility... Just as a judge cannot
be subjected to such a scrutiny ...so the integrity of the
administrative process must be equally respected.
It is of interest to note Mendelson's comment on the decision
in the Morgan case with regard to the examination of the
Secretary: 2
Thus succinctly was terminated the threat which has hung
over the administrative process since the first Morgan deci-
sion. But methodologically that threat was abolished in ex-
actly the same manner in which it originated; namely, by
analogy to the judicial process. This in itself should be a
sufficient condemnation of such reasoning as a method of
25 GEL ORN, ADmnSTRATIVE LAw, CASES AND ComrmNTS 702 (2d ed. 1947).
26 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 61 S. Ct. 999, 85 L. Ed. 1429
(1941). Morgan IV came back to the Supreme Court five years after Morgan I
was decided.
27 313 U.S. at 422.
28 Mendelson, Some Administrative Implications of the Morgan Decisions,
30 Ky. L. J. 408, 415 (1942).
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determining the propriety or impropriety of administrative
procedures.
It would appear that the threat has lately been removed
insofar as federal administrative bodies are concerned. But
in the state courts the situation is still confusing. In State
ex rel. Madison Airport Company v. Wrabetz,29 it was held
that since a failure by the Industrial Commission of Wis-
consin to consider the evidence presented before a trial
examiner in a workmen's compensation case would invali-
date the order, it was proper that a court should inquire
into the regularity of the Commission's proceedings by tak-
ing evidence thereon in a suit to set aside an award. Also,
it was essential that all Commissioners review the record in
the case. In Joyce v. Bruckman, ° it was held that all the
members of the State Liquor Authority must read and ap-
praise the record of the case. Another Wisconsin case 31
determined that it was improper to question an administra-
tive tribunal as to the course of its deliberations in order
to impeach its decision. The court noted that this was a
rule "founded on good sense and public expediency .... )) 32
Further, it was stated that: 8'
The idea is that there should be no possibility of the over-
turning of a judgment or final determination of a contro-
versy which has been reached after fair trial and hearing by
reason of the fact that one of the body which rendered the
judgment at some later period, either honestly or dishonestly,
or from mere failure of memory, impeaches the result by
testifying to some defect in the mental operations of himself
or his fellows, or to a mistaken view of the legal principles
applicable to the case. Important decisions of this kind can-
not be upset or discredited in this manner, if they are to be
of any value....
29 231 Wis. 147, 285 N.W. 504 (1939).
30 257 App. Div. 795, 15 N.Y.S. (2d) 679 (1939).
81 Appleton Waterworks Co. v. Railroad Commission, 154 Wis. 121, 142
N.W. 476 (1913).




Vom Baur in his excellent book on administrative law
states that: "The reports and orders of an agency ordinarily
constitute the only authoritative evidence of its action." 84
Thus, it would appear that the official record would speak
for itself. And, under the decisions of the Supreme Court
and the federal courts, discussed in this article, it would
seem that an examination could not be had on an admin-
istrative agency's deliberations leading up to its decision.
Furthermore, it would seem that evidence of deliberations
prior to the decision would be barred by the parol evidence
rule, if the reasoning of Mr. Wigmore in the analogous prob-
lem involved in jury deliberations is to be accepted. 8 If
the authenticity of the record in official files is called into
question, officers and employees having knowledge of the
matter could be required to testify as to the correctness of
the record. 8 However, that is an entirely different situa-
tion from one where interrogatories are posed for discovery
of mental processes underlying administrative decisions.
In a note in one of the prominent law reviews, written
in connection with the Cherry Cotton Mills case, there is
an interesting discussion, as follows, of the pro and con of
interrogatories: 87
One may reasonably argue in this case that the board's
function would be so seriously hampered by subjecting it to
such interrogatories that, as a matter of policy, the courts
should refuse to grant them. The act empowers the board
to become a litigant in the United States courts; does this
mean that the board assumes the character of an ordinary
litigant so that it should not be given special consideration?
The courts may well treat the board with some deference,
it being an arm of the government, seeking to enforce the law.
If this view be adopted, does the 'power to issue interroga-
tories arise from necessity? One may say, on the other hand,
34 I Vom BAU R, FEDEm Ao mTRAT=IV LAW 444 (1942).
85 8 WIozoP u, Ev mrC § 2348 (3d ed. 1940).
86 Blair v. Oesterlein Co., 275 U.S. 220, 48 S. Ct. 87, 72 L. Ed. 249 (1927).
37 37 MICH. L. .Rv. 1121, 1123 (1939).
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that it is wiser to protect litigants from the chance of irregu-
larity, and create no presumption in favor of the board.
And further on the discussion continues: 8
It would certainly be "necessary" for the court to have
power to issue interrogatories if this policy were adopted, i.e.,
inquiring into the board's treatment of facts. Little authority
has been found for the use of such interrogatories.
A note in the Harvard Law Review states, in part, that: 3
Short of an extended inquiry into mental processes, there
appears to be no manner of establishing with certainty that
written argument ever reached the deciders.
These views were expressed in articles written after
most of the cases which now form the law were decided.
Consequently, they may be considered as interesting legal
criticisms in no wise affecting the legal principles gov-
erning interrogatories addressed to administrative tribunals
and their officials.
In his discussion of the immunities of the President and
high executive officials, Professor Corwin in his recent re-
vised book on the Presidency, says:"
Here, of course, the question at issue was whether the
Supreme Court could require an official to answer, but the
doctrine stated is equally applicable to the case of an investi-
gation by a Congressional Committee. This doctrine is that
a high executive official is not bound to divulge matters re-
garding which he is a confidant of the President. At the same
time the Court impliedly claims the right to say finally
whether such a plea on the part of an official is a valid one.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Despite the Supreme Court's pronouncement in the Mor-
gan case that "the integrity of the administrative process
must be respected" and that the administrative process
must be protected from undue scrutiny, it would appear
that the Court is not yet ready to relinquish completely its
control over the preliminary phases of administrative de-
38 Id. at 1124.
89 See Note, 52 HARv. L. Rav. 509, 513 (1939).
40 CORWIN, TMa PRMIDENT: OMCE AND POWERS 138 (3d ed. 1948).
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terminations. Quite possibly there may be another flurry
of cases seeking to question the motives behind administra-
tive determinations such as occurred in the years 1938 and
1939. This time the administrative arm is strengthened by
a number of favorable judicial decisions. But it should be
remembered that the administrative tribunals must still de-
pend on the courts for protection in such discovery pro-
ceedings.
Louis C. Kaplan
